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New Zealand's Forgotten Promises: The
Treaty of Waitangi
ABSTRACT

This Note presents the problems the Maori, New Zealand's indigenous
people, have encountered in seeking enforcement of the Treaty of

Waitangi that they signed with Great Britain in 1840. It argues that the
Treaty of Waitangi is a valid legal document that should be fully integrated into New Zealand domestic law and afforded protection under
international law. The author argues that the Maori met the international law requirements of statehood in 1840 and, therefore, were capable of entering into a treaty with Great Britain. Even if there was no
Maori state capable of entering into a treaty, there is analogous international authority which suggests that a non-state can be a party to a
treaty. Further,because the document allegedly involved the cessation of
land or sovereignty or both, an agreement less formal than a treaty
would not have sufficed. The result is that New Zealand may incur state
responsibilityfor its failure to give full effect to the terms of the Treaty.
This Note explores both the English and Maori texts of the Treaty and
the doctrine of aboriginalrights to determine what rights to sovereignty
the Maori retained. In doing so, the Note addresses the domestic paths
taken by the United States and Canada concerningsimilar treaty interpretation and sovereignty issues that may be helpful to the Maori and
New Zealand in fashioning an appropriatesolution to settling the long
standing Treaty dispute. This Note suggests internationalremedies that
the parties may employ as well as other remedies that the Maori may
explore in the face of continued New Zealand resistance to their Treaty
claims.
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TREATY OF WAITANGI

I.

INTRODUCTION

New Zealanders regard the Treaty of Waitangi' as their founding
document,2 but for the Maori, the native people of New Zealand, the
Treaty's benefits have been illusory.3 Great Britain executed the Treaty
of Waitangi in the 1840s to assure colonial dominion and a peaceful coexistence between the British settlers and the Maori.4 During Great
Britain's colonization efforts which followed, 5 the Maori lost considera6
ble amounts of land and suffered severe social displacement.
New Zealand has historically displayed a facade of racial harmony,
but the societal divisions are quite apparent.7 Even today in New Zealand society the Maori hold a lower class position.8 Strained race relations are shouldering additional burdens due to activists' pressing for the
return of Maori land and sovereignty. 9
The Maori have consistently urged fulfillment of their rights under
the Treaty, whereas Great Britain and New Zealand have consistently
failed to honor those rights.1 0 The Maori expected two things: first, that

1. Treaty of Cession Between Great Britain and New Zealand, Signed at Waitangi,
Feb. 6, 1840, 89 Consol. T.S. 473 (English text) [hereinafter Treaty of Waitangi or
Treaty]. For the version of the text in Maori, see The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) reprinted in MANA TIRITI: THE ART OF PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP, 84 app. II
(Ramari Young ed., 1991) [hereinafter Maori Treaty of Waitangi].
2. New Zealand Prime Minister on Resolving Maori Problems, XINHUA GEN.
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, May 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni

File [hereinafter New Zealand Prime Minister].
3. Jane Kelsey, Decolonization in the "First World"-Indigenous Peoples' StrugglesforJusticeand Self-Determination (A Discussion of the Treaty of Waitangi and the
Bill of Rights), 5 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 102, 103 (1985).
4. Id. at 105-06. The famous explorer Captain Cook first arrived at New Zealand in
1769. Tony Simpson, One More Truth About the Treaty, in MANA TITI: THE ART
OF PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 24, 27. Missionaries began working in
the area in 1814. Id. Settlements began to be more prominant beginning in the 1830s.

Id. at 28.
5. Kelsey, supra note 3, at 104-05.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 103.
8. Id. at 105. For a discussion of the position the Maori currently hold in New
Zealand society see infra notes 45, 46, 65 and accompanying text; see also David Barber,
New Zealand Faces Racial Tension, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1990, at 6;
Kelsey, supra note 3, at 104. The Maori's plight is similar to that of indigenous peoples
in other states, who were also victims of colonialism and imperialism. See id. at 105.
9. Id. at 102-03.
10. Id. at 107; see also Dai Hayward, New Zealand 4; Maoris Get a Serious Hearing, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at 12.
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Great Britain would honor the treaty"1 and second, that the Maori
would remain in control of their state and destiny. 1 2 Many Maori, as
well as several scholars, argue for full implementation of the Treaty of
Waitangi." Even moderate Maoris advocate the return of some land or
compensation for its loss. 14 Compliance with land and fishing rights
under the Treaty, however, would cost New Zealand billions of
5
dollars.1
The Treaty addresses an additional right, which has also been denied-the Maori's right to self-determination. The Maori demand an
end to monoculturism and the policy of assimilation which threaten to
eradicate Maori culture and rights. 6 Therefore, in addition to enforcement of the Treaty's land and fishing rights, the Maori desire cultural,
economic, and political self-determination.' 7 New Zealand judicial decisions, however, state that a sharing of power and sovereignty is unacceptable." This traditional hostility of New Zealand courts toward Maori claims and rights make the courts an inadequate alternative for
solving the plight of Maori. 9
New Zealand courts historically have held the Treaty of Waitangi a
nullity and therefore gave it little effect in-decisions. 20 The 1975 Treaty
of Waitangi Act allows claims under the Treaty to be heard by the fivemember Waitangi Tribunal,' but the Tribunal's decisions are not legally binding, and they serve only as recommendations to the government
of New Zealand. 2 This does not comfort the Maori who wish to assert

11.

Kelsey, supra note 3, at 107.

12.
13.

Id.
JEROME B. ELKIND

&

ANTONY SHAW,

A STANDARD FOR

JUSTICE: A CRITI-

CAL COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND 36-45,

167-68 (1986); see also Hilary Charlesworth, Book Note, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 794, 797
(1987) (reviewing A STANDARD FOR JUSTICE: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON THE
PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND).

14. Barber, supra note 8, at 6.
15. Id.
16. Kelsey, supra note 3, at 113.
17. Id. at 103.
18. Police v. Dalton (unreported) (Auckland Mag. Ct., June 1979, per Blackwood
S.M.), discussed in Kelsey, supra note 3, at 111-12. "There cannot be one set of laws,
for example, for one ethnic group and another set of laws for another. If the rule of law
is not upheld, we have anarchy. If we have anarchy then civilised society will perish."

Id.
19.
20.
(S.C.
21,
22.

Kelsey, supra note 3, at 112.
See, e.g., Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington, 3 N.Z. Jur. Rep. (n.s.) 72, 78-79
1877).
See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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property rights and the right of self-determination under the Treaty.23
The government must reach a compromise with the Maori which guarantees the Maori economic rights and self-determination found both in
the Treaty of Waitangi and under the doctrine of aboriginal rights. This
compromise, however, must preserve private property rights and avoid
further inflammation of racial tensions.
This Note addresses the proper legal interpretation of the Treaty of
Waitangi and suggests solutions available under New Zealand and international law. Part II of this Note discusses the historical roots underlying the current conflict between the Maori and New Zealand over territorial and non-territorial rights. Part II concludes with an analysis of the
Waitangi Tribunal and the limited role its opinions may play.in solving
the conflict. Part III examines how the doctrine of aboriginal title and
how the semantic differences between the English and Maori versions of
the Treaty may affect Treaty analysis. Part IV sets forth a reasonable
interpretation of the Treaty and establishes that the Treaty of Waitangi
is a valid, enforceable treaty under international law. Part V summarizes
Canadian and United States progress toward interpreting treaty rights
and resolving conflicts with indigenous peoples that may be useful to the
Maori and the government of New Zealand in establishing a workable
domestic solution to the dispute. Part V also suggests that New Zealand
may incur international state responsibility for its failure to honor its
treaty obligations and reviews some international dispute resolution
mechanisms that may be available. This Note concludes that the Treaty
of Waitangi is a valid legal document, enforceable under international
law. Thus, the Treaty affords the Maori some type of redress for past
breaches that should be "settled by peaceful means and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law." 24
II.

A.

THE MAORI PEOPLE

Historical Background

The Maori people 25 accounted for nearly all of New Zealand's population before the arrival of European settlers over 150 years ago.28 In

23. For a discussion of rights under the Treaty, see infra Part III.
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 680
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].

25. The Maori refer to themselves as "tangata whenua," meaning first indigenous
people. David V. Williams, The Queen v. Symonds Reconsidered, 19 VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON LAW REVIEW [V.U.W.L.R.] 385, 386 (1989).
26. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 1991, at 36.
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1840 there were 200,000 Maoris and only 2000 European settlers.27
Letters of Patent which Great Britain issued directed the Governor of
New South Wales to enlarge British territory by ir~cluding "any territory
which is or may be acquired in sovereignty of Her Majesty . .. within
that group of Islands in the Pacific Ocean, commonly called New Zealand." 2 A state may assert dominion over a new territory by three methods: conquest, discovery, or entering a treaty with the resident peoples.29
Because New Zealand was already populated and the natives outnumbered the settlers 100 to 1, Great Britain chose to execute a treaty to
gain colonial rule of New Zealand. 30 The Crown specifically directed
Captain William Hobson to obtain the "free and intelligent consent of
the natives."'"
Captain Hobson, commissioned as Lieutenant-Governor of New Zealand,32 arranged for meetings with numerous tribal leaders on February
5, 1840.33 On February 6, 1840, approximately forty-five of the tribal
leaders signed the Treaty of Waitangi, 4 which generally provided that
the Queen would govern New Zealand and the Maori would be British
subjects, enjoying Crown protection and retaining title to land pending
potential sale to the Crown. 5 After the initial signing, various officials
and military officers traveled throughout the New Zealand territory to
obtain the signatures of additional tribal leaders.3 8 More than 500 tribal
leaders eventually affixed their signatures to the Treaty. 7 Many influen-

27.

Moana Jackson, Maori Law, Pakeha Law and the Treaty of Waitangi, in
supra note 1, at 14, 18.
28. Letters Patent of June 15, 1839, quoted in David V. Williams, The Annexation
of New Zealand to New South Wales in 1840: What of the Treaty of Waitangi?, 2
AUSTL. J.L. & Soc'Y 41, 41-42 (No. 2, 1985) (emphasis added).
29. Jackson, supra note 27, at 19.
30. Pita Rikys, Trick or Treaty, NEW ZEALAND LAW JOURNAL [N.Z.L.J.], Oct.
1991, at 370, 371. "They could not afford to conquer and from General Cameron's
subsequent experiences had they done so, the likelihood was that they would have been
thoroughly thrashed." Id.
31. Memorandum of Attorney-General William Swainson, Dec. 27, 1842, quoted in
Williams, supra note 25, at 51. This argument for a treaty is especially compelling
because Great Britain, even after signing the treaty, had only approximately 65 soldiers
MANA TIRITI: THE ART OF PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP,

stationed in the New Zealand territory. Id. at 51.
32. Id. at 42. Captain Hobson was commissioned, as both an envoy to the Maori
peoples and as Lieutenant-Governor of the New Zealand territory. Id. at 51.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Geoffrey Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi - Principlesfor Crown Action, 19
V.U.W.L.R. 335, 337 (1989).

36. Williams, supra note 25, at 42.
37. Id. at 42-43.
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tial Maori chiefs, however, adamantly refused to sign the Treaty."B
B.

The Maori Today and the Role of the Waitangi Tribunal

New Zealand regards the Treaty of Waitangi as its founding document 9 and celebrates the Treaty as part of a holiday known as Waitangi
Day.4" The Maori oppose celebration of the holiday and view the memorial with remorse because of Great Britain's failure to honor its obligations to the Maori."," Even Queen Victoria admitted, in a gross understatement, that the Treaty of Waitangi "has been imperfectly
' A more accurate characterization is that the European setobserved." 42
tlers ignored their treaty obligations4" despite the Maori's consistent attempts to enforce the provisions.44
The British failure to adhere to the Treaty has altered the face of
New Zealand. The Maori, who were once New Zealand's main resi-

dents and claimed all of its territory, now comprise only ten percent of
the population and own less than five percent of the land. 45 In the political arena, New Zealand voters have squeezed the Maori out of Parliament, resulting in the Maori having little effect on election outcomes.4

38. Id. at 43.
39. New Zealand Prime Minister, supra note 2.
40. Ask the Globe, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1991, at 20. The annual celebration,
created by the New Zealand Day Act of 1973, entails significant pomp and ceremonial
pageants. Williams, supra note 25, at 41.
41. See Williams, supra note 25, at 41.
42. Barber, supra note 8, at 6. The Queen made this statement while addressing
New Zealanders during a celebration of New Zealand's 150th birthday in 1990. Id.
43. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, supra note 26, at 36. After the settlers
gained power and possession of some lands the British wholly disregarded the Treaty of
Waitangi. Id.
44. See Kelsey, supra note 3, at 102-03, 107.
45. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, supra note 26, at 36; Judge Edward J.
Durie, Protection of Minorities, N.Z.L.J., Aug. 1987, at 260. Much of the land which
Maori people hold is of poor quality and cannot be developed. Id. Additionally, land to
the Maori holds a spiritual, as well as a material value. Queen Victoria Said It Was
Ours, THE ECONOMIST, June 3, 1978, at 84. The Maori plight further manifests itself
in the fact that although they represent approximately 10% of New Zealand's population, yet they comprise almost 50% of those in prison. Durie, supra note 45, at 260. The
Maori people have also been plagued by poor education and job training which has
resulted in a significantly higher unemployment rate among the Maori as compared to
other New Zealanders. New Zealand Prime Minister, supra note 2.
46. William Allen, New Zealand: Referendum Focuses on Minority Maori Rights,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 17, 1992. New Zealand currently employs a racially based
system called "First-Past-the-Post," which allows candidates with the most votes to go to
Parliament. Id. The result has been that the National and Labor Parties have dominated
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Because of the extreme diminution of tribal land holdings, many younger
Maoris are angry at the "Pakehas" who stole their land and at their
47
own ancestors for not successfully resisting the settlers.
Like dispossessed indigenous peoples of other states, the Maori claim
the Europeans took their land wrongfully."8 To right this wrong, the
Maori have continuously sought to enforce. the Treaty of Waitangi, and
they expect to regain some of their rights under it."9 Their expectations
derive in part from the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975,50 which grants
the Maori the right to petition the Waitangi Tribunal for resolution of
claims arising from the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi."
The Waitangi Tribunal has jurisdiction over claims dating back to
1840.52 The Maori may initiate a claim simply by submitting a letter to
the tribunal. 3 Resolving'a claim, however, is a very lengthy and complicated process. The five-member tribunal merely makes recommendations

to the Crown regarding compensation due the claimants; 5 the government ultimately decides the validity and value of each claim. 5 Claimants
are fortunate if they reach a settlement in ten years, and many compromise the value of their claims to facilitate settlement.5
The Waitangi Tribunal is overwhelmed with claims involving approx-

the legislature for over 40 years. Id. The Maori have 4 reserved seats on the 97 member
Parliament, which does little to safeguard their interests. Id. New Zealand voters are
currently considering a referendum to change this system to a proportional one. Id.; see

also Maoris Worried New Zealand Voting Changes Will Exclude Them,

AGENCE

FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 21, 1992.

47. Queen Victoria Said it Was Ours, supra note 45, at 84. "Pakeha" is the Maori
word for the white European settlers. Id.
48. Kelsey, supra note 3, at 113-17.
49. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, supra note 26, at 36.
50. Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 (N.Z.), First Schedule.

51. Shonagh E. Kenderdine, Statutory Separateness (2): The Treaty of Waitangi Act
1975 and the PlanningProcess, N.Z.L.J., Sept. 1985, at 300.
52. Edward T. Durie, A Peaceful Solution, in MANA TIRTI: THE ART OF PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 64. Charles P. Wallace, Maoris Get Property
and Fishing Rights, Sparking White Backlash: Land Dispute Highlights Racial Issue
in New Zealand, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 18, 1989, at 12, 13.
53. Durie, supra note 52, at 65.

54. David Stamp, New Zealand Faces Growing Race Problems on 150th Birthday,
REUTERS LIBR. REP., Feb. 6, 1990. Both Maoris and Pakehas have sat on the tribunal

in the past. Id.
55. Kenderdine, supra note 51, at 300.
56. Durie, supra note 52, at 64-65. See infra note 64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of a claim by the Ngai Tahu tribe that will have to be compromised to reach a
settlement.
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imately seventy percent of New Zealand's territory.57 This has aroused
concern about the substantial amount of compensation that may be due
the Maori." Moreover, severe economic difficulties may make New Zea-

land incapable of satisfying many large claims.5 Returning land to the
Maori-fulfilling the Tribunal's mission-may exacerbate the problems
by widening the racial division in New Zealand. ° Finally, some New
Zealanders fear that the Tribunal will award the Maori privately held
properties" because private purchasers now possess much of the land
that the British illegally confiscated. 2
The Waitangi Tribunal's first decision awarded one Maori tribe, the
Ngati Whaatua, approximately eighty acres of land around Bastion
Point and three million dollars in compensation.63 Another recent claim
for commercial fishing rights resulted in a recommendation to award the
Ngai Tahu tribe the "exclusive right to fish virtually all of the South

Island coastline as well as a reasonable share of the 200-mile deep water
fisheries."6
Although the Waitangi Tribunal is attempting to assume a significant

role in shaping the future of New Zealand and in resolving native
claims, changes in government policy may undermine the limited success
of the Tribunal.

5

Some factions, in fact, would revoke entirely the rec-

57. Barber, supra note 8, at 6.
58. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, supra note 26.
59. Li Yao, Year-Ender: Race Relations-Sensitive Issue in New Zealand Politics,
XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWs SERVICE, Dec. 27, 1989.

60. New Zealand; Waitangi's Wisdom, supra note 26; see also infra notes 63-66.
61.

Wallace, supra note 52, at 13.

62. R.P. Boast, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General. The Case of the
Century?, N.Z.L.J., Aug. 1987, at 240, 242.
63. Wallace, supra note 52, at 12.
64. Terry Hall, Tribunal Backs Maori Claim on Fisheries, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 12, 1992, at 26. The Ngai Tahu is one of New Zealand's smallest tribes with
approximately 28,000 members. Id. Prime Minister Jim Bolger has already stated that
the recommendation will not be accepted in full. Id.
65. New Zealand; Waitangi Wisdom, supra note 26, at 36. Maori rights are subject
to the ever changing policies of New Zealand's government. Allen, supra note 46. An
example of this is Prime Minister Jim Bolger's dismissal of Maori Affairs Minister
Winston Peters for "disloyalty." Id. Peter's had openly challenged the government's economic policies because of rising Maori unemployment rates in excess of three times the
national average. Id. Peters was replaced by a non-Maori. Id.
When the Tribunal suggested that the state purchase Maunganui Bluff, a piece of
land owned by a white farmer, and return it to the Te Roroa tribe, Bolger threatened to
change the law so the Tribunal could not make recommendations about private land any
longer. Maori Tribunal Ruling Threatens White New Zealanders, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, June 2, 1992.
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ognition of the validity of the Treaty of Waitangi.6 6 The Maori have
responded with increased pressure on the government and are demanding that the parties undertake full recognition and enforcement of the
Treaty of Waitangi, asserting that "no matter how much time passes the
'67
treaty must be honored."

III. THE TREATY'S TERMS
The Treaty of Waitangi is a relatively simple document consisting of
a preamble and three articles. Those wishing to avoid its enforcement
nevertheless label it as vague and meaningless.68 One scholar notes, however, that "a contentious matter such as the treaty will yield to those who
study it whatever they seek. If they look for difficulties and obstacles,
they will find them. If they are prepared to regard it as an obligation of
honour, they will find that the Treaty is well capable of implementation.""0 The Treaty is based on a partnership between the settlers and

the Maori, and, despite obstacles, it allows interpretation which is faithful to the spirit of the Treaty and a sense of fairness to both parties. 0
Perhaps the most problematic obstacle is the fact that Great Britain
prepared The Treaty of Waitangi in both English and the native Maori
language, 7 ' and the English version is not an exact translation of the
Maori text.1 2 Over 500 of the Maori leaders signed only the Maori
text, 3 while approximately thirty tribal chiefs signed both the English
and the Maori texts. 4 Captain Hobson, on behalf of the British govern-

66.

New Zealand National Party's Drastic Racial Policy Proposal Evokes Outcry,

XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, May 5, 1990. For instance; Peter Talley of

Talley's Fisheries, in response to the recommendation for an award of fishing rights to
the Nagai Tahu tribe stated that the Treaty of Waitangi should be "consigned to the
cupboard" and called the Waitangi Tribunal a "kangaroo court." Minister Urges Calm
Following Maori Ruling, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 11, 1992.
67. Hayward, supra note 10, at 12.
68. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
69. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 673
(Richardson, J. quoting comments of Henare Ngata in his evidence in the case).
70.

Robin Cooke, Fairness, 19 V.U.W.L.R. 421 (1989); see also Nick Gerritsen,

The Treaty of Waitangi: "Do I Dare, Disturb the Universe?", N.Z.L.J., Apr. 1987, at
138, 138 (Gerritsen argues that the Treaty "concerns values and morality, more than
mere legal interpretation").
71.

Jackson, supra note 27, at 17-19. The Crown prepared the English text, and

British missionaries to New Zealand translated it into Maori. Id. at 19.
72.

Boast, supra note 62, at 243; see infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.

73. Jackson, supra note 27, at 17-19.
74, Id.
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ment, signed both versions. 5 Initial problems arose precisely because the
English version is not an exact translation of the Maori text.7 6
New Zealanders claim that analyzing the English version of the
Treaty of Waitangi is a difficult task because it is a "short, sparse document, full of ambiguities. . . . Problems of construction and interpretation can easily arise." 77 The choice of words in the Maoin text, however,
suggests that there was in fact deliberateness because certain terms convey to the Maori not ambiguity, but rather particular messages.7 8
A.

The English Text

One New Zealand Court of Appeal summed up the Treaty as follows:
"[T]he basic terms of the bargain were that the Queen was to govern
and the Maoris were to be her subjects; in return their chieftainships
and possessions were to be protected, but sales of land to the Crown
could be negotiated. 71 9 Specifically, article I in the English text purports
to cede to Great Britain the tribal chiefs' sovereignty over their individual territories.8" Article II states that the tribes should have the "full,
exclusive, and undisturbed possession" of their lands and fisheries but
allows Great Britain the pre-emptive right to purchase land that the natives wish to sell.8 1 Some read the articles I and II as qualifying, and
75. Id.
76. See Boast, supra note 62, at 243.
77. Id. at 243.
78. R.P. Boast, The Treaty of Waitangi: A Frameworkfor Resource Management
Law, 19 V.U.W.L.R. Monograph 1, 4 (1989); see also infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
79. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 663.
80. See Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 1, at 475. The English text of article I provides as follows:
The chiefs of the confederation of the united tribes of New Zealand ... cede to
Her Majesty, the Queen of England, absolutely, and without reservation, all the
rights and powers of sovereignty which the said confederation of individual chiefs
respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to posses, over
their respective territories, as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
Id.
81. Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 1, at 475. Article II in the English text provides
as follows:
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees ... the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and
other properties which they may collectively or individually possess, so long as it is
their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession. But the chiefs . . .
yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of pre-emption over such lands as the
proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate, at such prices as may be agreed
upon between the respectivi proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to
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being somewhat dependent on, one another.8 2 Article III extends to the
Maori royal protection and affords them the rights and privileges of
British subjects. 83 The concluding portion of the text of the English version provides that the Maori understood the provisions of the Treaty."4
The Wellington Law Commission describes the Treaty of Waitangi as
one that "gave the Crown what it sought: sovereignty and governance
over New Zealand. This is a continuing authority and power. What the
Maori received in return is likewise ongoing, the continued protection of
the rights that the Treaty acknowledged as theirs.""8
B.' The Maori Text
The text of the Treaty of Waitangi in the Maori language contains
significant linguistic differences.8 6 The Waitangi Tribunal asserts that
the Maori text "[c]onveyed an intention that the Maori would retain full
authority over their lands, homes, and things important to them .... ,,s1
treat with them in that behalf.
Id.
Article II was essentially the price paid by Great Britain to obtain sovereignty granted
in article I. Palmer, supra note 35, at 340.
82. Palmer, supra note 35, at 340.
83. Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 1, at 475. The text of article III in the English
version provides as follows:
In consideration thereof, Her Majesty, the Queen of England, extends to the natives of New Zealand Her Royal protection, and imparts to them all the rights

and privileges of British subjects.

Id.
84. Id. The provision provides:
Now, therefore, we the chiefs of the confederation of the united tribes of New
Zealand, being assembled in congress at Victoria in Waitangi, and we, the separate and independent chiefs of New Zealand, claiming authority over the tribes
and territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made
fully to understand the provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into
the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof.
In witness of which, we have attached our signatures or marks at the places and
dates respectively specified.
Id.
85. The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori FisheriesMataitai:Nga Tikanga Maori Me
Te Tititi o Waitangi A Background Paper, Preliminary Paper No. 9 (Law Commission,
Wellington, 1989) para. 755, at 52, quoted in Palmer, supra note 35, at 341.
86. Translation problems are limited to articles I and II, so this section will not
discuss article III. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
article.
87. Orakei Report: Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai 9),
The Waitangi Tribunal, Department of Justice, Wellington, New Zealand (1987),
quoted in Palmer, supra note 35, at 340.
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This is in sharp contrast to the English text, which conveys a Maori
intention to cede sovereignty to the Crown.8 8
Article I in the Maori text uses the Maori word "kawanatanga" instead of sovereignty.89 It is unlikely that "kawanatanga" conveys to the
Maori the English meaning of sovereignty. 0 Kawanatanga means the
"authority to make laws for the good order and security of the country,
but subject to an understanding to protect particular Maori interests.""1
Another interpretation of article I as a whole suggests that the Treaty
gave the Crown the right to govern its colonists but that authority over
'
the Maori would continue to reside with the "iwi.92
Article II in the Maori text uses the word "rangatiratanga," which
'93
conveys a much clearer sense of sovereignty than does "kawanatanga,
to designate the rights that would remain with the Maori people. 4 Some
activists argue that the language of article II confers "full and exclusive"9 authority to the Maori. Activists justify this interpretation with
the precolonial condition: in 1840 the Maori exercised authority over all
of New Zealand and its resources.98 The Maori text recognizes the rangatiratanga that the Maori had exercised over their people and resources
97
for centuries.
Article II has been the subject of controversy in light of the Crown
Principles for Action on the Treaty of Waitangi issued by New Zealand

88. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
89. Maori Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 1, at 84.
90. CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 40-41 (1987), quoted in Boast,
supra note 78, at 4. The concept of sovereignty in English encompasses much more than
the Maori word the translators chose. Unlike "kawanatanga," the English concept of
sovereignty includes the right to exercise jurisdiction nationally and internationally.
Kawanatanga "tended to imply authority in an abstract rather than a concrete sense."

Id.
91. Motunui Report, Aila Taylor (Te Atiawa, re Motunui), Wai-6, Mar. 1983,
quoted in Boast, supra note 78, at 4.
92. Jackson, supra note 27, at 19. "Iwi" means individual tribes. Id. Pakeha experts
have defined the term kawanatanga. The roots of kawanatanga can be traced to the Bible
where it simply means governance. Id.
93. Boast, supra note 78, at 7; see also ORANGE, supra note 90, at 41.
94. Boast, supra note 78, at 7. "Te tino rangatiratanga" can be said to convey a
meaning of "the full authority, or full chieftainship, or maybe complete sovereignty." Id.
The word rangatiratanga "implies something rather more than a mere right of possession
until alienation, and this different terminology in the two texts is of real importance in
view of the possibility that" the Maori text may prevail. Id.
95. Jackson, supra note 27, at 19-20.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id.
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in 1989.8 The New Zealand government named five principles: The
Principle of Government, or Kawanatanga; The Principle of Self-Management, or Rangatiratanga; The Principle of Equality; The Principle of
Reasonable Co-operation; and The Principle of Redress."9 The first
principle states that because the Maori ceded sovereignty, the government has the right to govern and make laws which prioritize Maori
rights. 00 The second principle states that New Zealand will protect rangatiratanga, but that protection is subject to the government's right to
govern.' The third princple recognizes that the Maori and other New
Zealanders are equal before the law'0 2 and that common law shall serve
as the basis for this equality.' The fourth principle recognizes a partnership between the Maori and the Crown.' 04 The fifth principle acknowledges the right to redress grievances under the Treaty through the

courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation with the
government.'0 5
Some Maori believe that New Zealand has attempted to modify the
Treaty, particularly article I and its five principles. There is also particular concern with the government's selection of the common law as an
interpretative tool because neither version of the Treaty makes reference
to the common law.'
The Maori believe that their version of the
Treaty upholds the status quo of 1840, ensuring that they would share
the land with the European settlers, and that the Maori would continue
07
to exercise rangatiratanga over their lands and properties.1

98.

Id.

99.

Palmer, supra note 35, at 338.

100. Id. at 338-39. The sovereignty recognized in the first principle is qualified by a
promise to "accord an appropriate priority" to Maori rights specified in article II of the
Treaty of Waitangi. Id. at 338.
101.

Id. at 340-41.

102. Id. at 341.
103.

Id.

104.

Id. at 342.

105. Id.
106. Jackson, supra note 27, at 20-21. It is also suggested that there is a fourth
article to the Treaty of Waitangi that was not recorded but to which all parties clearly

agreed prior to signing. This fourth article was to protect the important laws and customs of Maori society. Id. at 21.
107. Id.
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C.

Effect of the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title

Some scholars argue that the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi is
merely declaratory of the common law doctrine of aboriginal title' 0 8 and
that the doctrine aids in the interpretation of the two texts. The doctrine
of aboriginal title provides that regardless of the method of acquisition of
a territory, a state takes it subject to the pre-existing property rights
enjoyed by the native peoples. 0 9 Under this theory, the Crown, in essence, acquired New Zealand subject to the pre-existing aboriginal
rights." 0 These rights include those related to hunting, fishing, flora collection, occupation and cultivation."' The Waitangi Tribunal recognizes
the existence of rights other than those specified in the Treaty of
Waitangi, specifically, those concerning aboriginal fishing rights.1 2 Because the doctrine of aboriginal rights has a common law basis," 3 the
voluntary sale, cessation by the aboriginal owners, or statutory elimina-

tion of the common law right can extinguish aborignial title."
Aboriginal rights are property rights the Maori could claim without
benefit of any treaty." 5 The doctrine creates burdens on the legal title to
parcels of New Zealand land."' As an inherent right, the aboriginal
right to property is not dependent upon statutory recognition."' This
undermines arguments that the Treaty of Waitangi is only applicable
where the state has adopted it by passing a statute." 8 In fact, the doctrine of aboriginal title clarifies the extent of Maori rights outlined in the
108.

P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952, 16

V.U.W.L.R. 313, 316-17 (1986) [hereinafter McHugh, Aboriginal Servitudes].
109. Id. at 316.
110. Id. at 317. One scholar argues that the reach of the doctrine of aboriginal title
has been extinguished for territorial claims because the common law has been overridden
by specific New Zealand statutes, such as the Maori Affairs Act 1953, 8 R.S.N.Z. 705
(1960), which superseded the Native Land Act 1909. See P.G. McHugh, The Constitutional Role of the Waitangi Tribunal, 224 N.Z.L.J., July 1985, 224-25. However, even
this position recognized that the right may still remain for non-territorial claims. Id. The
doctrine is still helpful in analyzing the intent of the written treaty.
111. Id.
112. See Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, I N.Z.L.R. 680 (1986); see also
Kenderdine, supra note 51, at 303.
113. McHugh, Aboriginal Servitudes, supra note 108, at 317.
114. Id.; see, e.g., The Queen v. Symonds, 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387, 388.
115. See McHugh, Aboriginal Servitudes, supra note 108, at 317.
116. Id. A grant of land title by the Crown is taken subject to the aboriginal right.
Id.

117. P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Rights and Sovereignty: Commonwealth Developments, N.Z.L.J., Feb. 1986, at 57 [hereinafter McHugh, Aboriginal Rights].
118.

Id.
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Treaty of Waitangi. Where the intent of the Treaty is unambiguous, this
doctrine provides interpretative guidance.
Although the New Zealand Court of Appeals has not resolved definitively the question of aboriginal rights, it is likely that courts will eventually recognize the doctrine.1 19 In the 1877 case of Wi Paritav. Bishop
of Wellington,120 the court found that rights based upon aboriginal title
were nonexistent. The 1986 decision of Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries
Officer, 12 ' however, held that the Maori could exercise "customary
rights."'1 22 The defendant asserted that he was not bound by the Act's
regulations because he was exercising his traditional Maori rights. 123
The court held that because the statute at issue, the Fisheries Act, did
not expressly extinguish the Maori customary fishing right, that right
continued to exist.124 Given the court's willingness to recognize customary rights, this case suggests that, in a proper case, the courts may be
willing to recognize the analogous doctrine of aboriginal rights.' 26

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

Although New Zealand courts originally held the Treaty of Waitangi

a nullity, 26 they officially recognized it by passing the Treaty of
119. F.M. Brookfield, Maori Rights and Two Radical Writers: Review and Response, N.Z.L.J., Nov. 1990, at 406.
120. 3 N.Z. Jur, Rep. (n.s.) 72 (S.C. 1877).
121. 1 N.Z.L.R. 680 (1986). Te Weehi involved a member of the Ngai Tabu tribe
who was convicted of violating the Fisheries Act. Id. at 682. The Fisheries Act of 1983
prohibits the possession of fish that are smaller than regulations allows. Id. Section 88(2)
of the act specifies that the provisions of the act do not affect Maori fishing rights. Id. at
683. The defendant was convicted of having undersized paua and acting in a threatening
manner toward a fisheries officer. Id. The defendant had collected the fish for immediate
consumption. Id.
122. Id. The defendant claimed as a defense that he had a Maori fishing right to
collect shellfish off the Motunau Coast for "personal and family consumption." Id. at
682. Customary rights are generally those arising "by the traditional possession and use
enjoyed by Maori tribes prior, to 1890." Id. at 686.
123. Id. at 683.
124. Id. at 681; see also Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, 107 D.L.R.3d 513, 552 (1979) (Can.) (test is whether legislation "expressed a clear and plain intention to extinguish that right"), cited with approval
in Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries, 1 N.L.Z.R. 680, 691 (1986).
125. See Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority, 2 N.Z.L.R.
188, 206 (1987) (holding that the Waikato Valley Authority's Planning Tribunal should
consider evidence pertaining to traditional relationships of the Maori with natural water
bodies in granting water rights).
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Wallace, supra note 52, at
13 (By the turn of the century a British governor had labeled the Treaty of Waitangi a
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Waitangi Act of 1975.127 The Act directs the Waitangi Tribunal to identify claims that are inconsistent with the Treaty. 1 28 While the Tribunal
has recognized the validity of some claims, it has avoided the precarious
position of full enforcement of the Treaty. The Waitangi Tribunal has
not undertaken the task, for instance, of determining which of the two
different texts is applicable because the government directed it to accept
both.' 2 9
A.

Legal Validity of the Treaty

1. The Treaty of Waitangi is a Treaty Subject to the Rules of International Law
Some scholars contend that the Treaty of Waitangi is not a treaty at
all because: 1) the Maori did not belong to a state capable of making a
treaty; 2) Great Britain actually took New Zealand by conquest; 3) the
Treaty is not incorporated into domestic law; and 4) the Treaty of
Waitangi, despite its name, is simply not a treaty.3 0 Other scholars believe that New Zealand's Chief Justice Martin and Justice Richmond
resolved the issue of the Treaty's validity when they declared it valid and
binding in the case of The Queen v. Symonds. 3 ' Besides the Symonds
1 32
case, however, there has been little judicial recognition of the Treaty.
"nullity.")
127. Kenderdine, supra note 51, at 303. Section 6(1) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act

of 1975 provides:
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider claims-where any Maaori claims that he
or any group of Maaoris of which he is a member is or is likely to be prejudicially
affected-

(a) by any Act, regulations or Order in Council, for the time being in force, or
(b) by any [sic] policy or practice adopted by or on behalf of the Crown and for

the time being in force or by any policy or practice proposed to be adopted or on
behalf of the Crown: or
-and that the Act, regulations or Order in Council or the policy, practice or Act
is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty he may submit that claim to the
Tribunal under this section ....

Id.
128. See id.
129.

See id.

130. See generally Betty Carter, The Incorporation of the Treaty of Waitangi into
Municipal Law, 4 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 1 (1980).
131. 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387. Symonds concerned a suit between two officials of the
colonial government brought to determine whether the previous governor had the authority to waive the court's rights to preemption. Id. Various scholarly articles have supported the court's position as to the Treaty's validity. Williams, supra note 25, at 387.
132. Carter, supra note 130, at 1.
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The inclusion of the word "treaty" in the title of the document may be
substantial evidence that the parties intended the Treaty of Waitangi to
be legally binding. As United States Supreme Court Justice Marshall
stated in Worcester v. Georgia:'3 "The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are
words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood
meaning."'3 4 Because the language of the United States and Great Britain is the same, for the most part, this principle arguably would apply to
the use of the word "treaty" in the present case as well.
A treaty is an agreement between two or more subjects of international law which produces legal effects or creates rights and obligations.' 3 5 Treaties are a source of "special" or "particular" law, applicable to the parties to the agreement, which supplant general law.' 6
Treaties, in contrast to conventions, pacts, acts, declarations, or protocols,
are the most formal type of international agreement. 3 Generally, a
treaty requires the same elements that binding private contracts require:
1) a legal objective; 2) consent; and 3) capacity. 38 In addition, Article 3
of the Vienna Convention requires treaties to be in writing to be enforceable under the Convention.' 39
The Treaty of Waitangi meets the criteria of a valid, enforceable
treaty. First, the Treaty of Waitangi clearly creates rights and obligations for both parties. Great Britain obtained the right for its citizens to
settle in the territory, sovereignty over at least its own people and lands,
and the right of pre-emptive purchase of property. 4 There is no suggestion that cessation of land or sovereignty would not be a legal objective.
Great Britain undertook an obligation to "confirm and guarantee" the
exclusive and undisturbed possession of the land possessed by the Maori.14 The Maori would retain rights to their lands, fisheries, and peo133. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
134. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).

135. Jim~nez de Ar&haga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, 159
Rec. des Cours 35-37 (1978), reprinted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES

AND MATERIALS

389, 390-91 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter International

Law: Cases and Materials].
136. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 57 (6th ed. 1963).

137.
138,
139.
140.
panying
141.
panying

Id. at 317.
Id. at 317-18.
Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 3, 8 I.L.M. at 681-82.
See infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text; supra notes 79-80 and accomtext.
See infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text; see supra note 81 and accomtext.
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ples, and would have the rights and privileges of British citizenship.14 2
Second, the Treaty is a written instrument entered into with the consent
of both parties.143 Third, the parties had legal capacity to enter into the
agreement.' Finally, because the document allegedly involved the cessation of land or sovereignty or both, a less formal international agreement
45
would not have sufficed.1
2.

The Maori Belonged to a State Capable of Entering into a Treaty

Article I of the Vienna Convention states that its rules apply to treaties between states. 146 Article VI establishes that every state has the capacity to enter into treaties.' 47 A state is "a system of relations which
men establish among themselves as a means of securing certain objects,
of which the most fundamental is a system of order within which their
activities can be carried on."'14 The Third Restatement on the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States establishes four criteria for statehood: 1) a defined territory; 2) a permanent population; 3) that the terri-

tory be under the control of its own government; and 4) that it engages,
49
or has the capacity to engage, in relations with other states.1
One of two different theories usually determines the existence of statehood. The first is the constitutive theory, which looks to other states' acts
of recognition to ascertain whether an entity is a state. 150 Under this
theory, existing states essentially create new states. Applying this theory

142. See infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 80-84.
144. See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
145. De Ar&haga, supra note 135, at 391. De Ar&haga refers to a situation concerning the cessation of a small piece of land by France to Switzerland to enlarge the
Geneva Airport. Id. Despite the triviality of the agreement, a treaty had to be concluded
because there was a cessation of sovereignty of state territory. Id.
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 1, 8 I.L.M. at 680. Although article 4
of the Vienna Convention states that the Convention is not retrotactive, the principles
embodied in it are still highly persuasive as statements of the general and customary
rules of international law. See id. arts. 3-4, at 681-82.
147. Id. art. 6, at 682.
148. BRIERLY, supra note -136, at 126:
149.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF

THE

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

OF

THE UNITED

STATES § 201 (1986); see also Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; BRIERLY, supra note 136, at 137.
150. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 231. The flaw
with this theory becomes apparent when one state recognizes statehood while others refuse to do so. See BRIERLY, supra note 136, at 138. Lack of official recognition does not
mean, however, that a state has no rights or duties under international law. Id. at 138-
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to the instant circumstances, Great Britain's act of negotiating a treaty
with the Maori tribal leaders evidences Great Britain's recognition of the
Maori's statehood. Although some authorities question the capacity of
the Maori tribal leaders to enter into treaties, Great Britain's willingness
to execute the Treaty of Waitangi can be considered evidence that Great
Britain believed that the Maori belonged to a sovereign nation and that
it recognized Maori statehood.
The second, more widely supported theory, is the declaratory theory."' 1 The declaratory theory evaluates the facts to determine whether
the criteria of statehood are evident. 5 2 Under this theory, a state may
exist even if other states do not formally recognize it. 5 ' Moreover, a
state meeting the conditions of statehood cannot be denied its rights, or
escape its obligations, under international law merely because of non154
recognition by other states.
In 1840, the Maori were a people with a defined territory and therefore met the first qualification for statehood under international law.1 55
The territory of a state need not have precisely identified boundaries . 56
The Maori claimed all of New Zealand and inhabited considerable territory. 157 The New Zealand courts have recognized this. In the case of
Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor General, 58 for example, the court stated
that for every part of New Zealand, there was a native owner."
The more than 200,000 Maori residing in New Zealand in 1840 fulfilled the criteria of a permanent population under international law.' 60
Today the international community regards states with small populations, such as Nauru with a population of 8,000, and Liechtenstein, with
a population of 28,000, as meeting the population requirements for
statehood.'

151. Id. at 139.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. U.N. SCOR 3, Sess., 383d mtg., No. 128, at 9-12 (1948) (statements of Philip
C. Jessup), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note
135, at 233. These statements were made advocating the admission of Israel to the
United Nations. Id. at 232. Many states, including the United States, began existence
while their frontiers were unsettled. Id. at 233. Yet, the existence of the United states
was never questioned before its final boundaries were determined. Id. at 234.
157. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
158. 32 N.Z.L.R. 321 (1913).
159. See Carter, supra note 130, at 3.

160. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
161.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL,

supra note 135, at 234.
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The most frequent question is whether a government controlled the
Maori in 1840."2 The Maori were not a people without law; they were

governed by Maori law which the various tribes executed. 8' One example of the existing governmental structure was a well defined system of
land ownership. 16 4 Another example was the Maori system of land conservation, which was advanced for its time. 1 5 There were also two religions present among the Maori people. 6 The Maori of 1840 were a
people with a structured society under a legal system that had been in
place for a substantial period of time. 6 That the Maori legal procedures differed from the adversarial system in other states is insufficient
cause to deny existence of the Maori government. Indeed, the contemporary proceedings of the Waitangi Tribunal take into account the legal
68
system, language, and history of the Maori.1
Arguably, capacity to enter into relations with other states is evidenced
by the Treaty's existence and the fact that more than five hundred tribal
chiefs signed the document. The fact that the tribal leaders signed the
Treaty only because article I, which designates Great Britain's rights,
used the word "kawanatanga" instead of "rangatiratanga," also evidences a capacity to engage in foreign relations. 6

162. Carter, supra note 130, at 3.
163. Jackson, supra note 27, at 15-16. When the settlers arrived, they did not find a
system of police, courts, judges, and lawyers and assumed, therefore, that the Maori had
no law. Id. at 15. Yet, there were mechanisms well practiced by the Maori to make
agreements and insure that enforcement would be available. Id. at 15-16; see also Joe

Williams, Chapman is Wrong, N.Z.L.J., Oct. 1991, at 370, 373 ("Nor would anyone
have suggested that the tribes were not in fact self-governing. Any attempt at the time of
the Treaty's signing to take land without purchase or supplant tribal government without consent would have led to war with little doubt as to the victors.").
164. Carter, supra note 130, at 2-5.
165. Id. at 4-5; Jackson, supra note 27, at 15-16.
166. Carter, supra note 130, at 6-7.
167. Id. at 4-5; Jackson, supra note 27, at 15-16.
168. Kenderdine, supra note 51, at 300; see also Durie, supra note 52, at 64-66
(explaining the process when a claim is heard by the Waitangi Tribunal).
169. Carter, supra note 130, at 2; see also Jackson, supra note 27, at 18-19. Additional support for the proposition that the 1840 Maori were a nation capable of entering
into a treaty may be found by analogy to the United States treatment of Native American
tribes as independent nations. The United States government continues to regard American Indian tribes as independent nations, and has established exclusive relations with the
Indians. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832). See generally Mark
Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,16 Am.
INDIAN L. REv. 57 (1991). Many early United States treaties with American Indian
tribes were similar to the Treaty of Waitangi and often recognized the national character
of a tribe, the right of self-government, guarantees of land, and the duty of protection
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Validity of Treaties with Non-States

Even if the Maori did not meet the criteria for statehood under Article
1 of the Vienna Convention, the treaty is nevertheless enforceable. Support for this proposition arises by analogy to other situations in which
non-states were recognized as parties to enforceable treaties. The International Court of Justice has held that a state and an international organization may conclude treaties.17 0 In the jurisdictional phase of the
South West Africa Cases, for example, the court held that the League of
Nations could be a party to a treaty.17 ' The United Nations Convention
on Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations
also recognizes the ability of organizations to enter into valid, enforceable
treaties with states.'7 2 Thus, meeting the Vienna Convention's criteria
for statehood is not a requisite for recognizing a treaty. Even if the Maori were not a "state" in 1840, the agreement with Great Britain is a
treaty enforceable under international law.
4.

Incorporation into Domestic Law

Generally there are two steps in making a treaty: signature by the parties and ratification by the heads of states.'1 3 Ratification, however, is not
always a prerequisite to establishing a treaty's validity internationally or
domestically.' 7 4 "There is no legal nor even a moral duty on a state to
ratify a treaty... ; it can only be said that refusal is a serious step which
ought not be taken lightly."' 7 5 Any arguments that Great Britain's lack
of ratification invalidated the Treaty are unpersuasive because Great
7
Britain enjoyed the Treaty's benefits.1 6
In Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea DistrictMaori Land Board, the New
Zealand Privy Council held that even if the Treaty of Waitangi is valid,
77
it does not become part of domestic law unless statutes give it effect.'

pledged by the United States. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556.
170. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings 4; see also Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1
(1978).
171. South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. at 4.
172. See United Nations Convention on Treaties Concluded between States and International Organizations, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.129/15 (Mar. 20, 1986).

173.

BRIERLY,

supra note 136, at 319.

174. Id. at 320-21; MICHAEL AKEHURST, A
NATIONAL LAW 130 (5th ed. 1984).
175. BRIERLY, supra note 136, at 320.
176. Carter, supra note 130, at 8-10.
177. 1941 N.Z.L.R. 590, 596-97.

MODERN INTRODUCTION

To

INTER-
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New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General undermines this position, however, by holding that section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises
Act precludes land transfers that are "inconsistent with the principles of
the Treaty of Waitangi.' '1a7 Furthermore, in Huakina Development
Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority, the court relied on the Treaty of
Waitangi as authoritative "extrinsic material," even in the absence of
reference in a statutory scheme. ' 9 Additionally, under international law,
New Zealand cannot assert lack of incorporation into domestic law as a
defense to fulfilling its treaty obligations.' 8 0
B.

The Rule of Pacta Sunt Servanda

The international law principle of pacta sunt servanda states the basic premise that. parties are expected to perform the international obligations to which they are bound.' This rule of customary international
law is also stated in article 26 of the Vienna Convention.8 2 Great Britain's stated policy was to abide by its treaties with indigenous peoples
and to expect the natives to fulfill their obligations as well.' 83 The

Crown, however, has historically ignored the good faith requirement of
pacta sunt servanda and, until recently, has made little attempt to
honor its treaty obligations with the Maori.

178.

[1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 642.

179.

[1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 188, 210. The court stated:

There can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of New Zealand
society. It follows that it is part of the context in which legislation which impinges
upon its principles is to be interpreted when it is proper, in accordance with the
principles of statutory interpretation, to have resort to extrinsic material.
Id.
180. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 46, 8 I.L.M. at 697. The text of article
46(1) provides:
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
181. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 433.
182. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 26, 8 I.L.M. at 690. The text of article
26 provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Id.
183. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547-48. Justice Marshall referred to the general views of
Great Britain as expressed by Superintendent Stuart, of Indian Affairs, at a speech given

in Mobile, Alabama. Id. at 547.
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The Rule of Contra Proferentum

International law principles also resolve the question of which version
of the text of the Treaty of Waitangi should prevail. Under the rule of
contra proferentum, the Maori text should prevail because the Maori
text played the "predominant role" in securing the signatures of the various chiefs.18 4 This rule conflicts with the Treaty of Waitangi Act of
1975, which gives equal weight to both versions of the text.""' The
Waitangi Tribunal, however, gives some effect to the Maori text and
recognizes the principles set out in the analogous United States Supreme
Court case of Jones v. Meehan.18 The rule in Jones was that treaties
with native peoples should be interpreted "in the sense in which they
would naturally be understood by the Indians."' 87 This rule expresses a
preference to the text of a treaty that is in the language of the indigenous
people.
Despite the fact that the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 requires that
the Waitangi Tribunal take into account both versions of the Treaty, it
is apparent that under the rule of contra proferentum, the Maori text
should take precedence. One scholar has stated that "[fjor too long all
academic discussion of the Treaty has proceeded on the incorrect assumption either that the English text is the Treaty or that it is an accurate translation of the Treaty." 8 8
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which states the international
law principle that the text of a treaty is assumed to be the intention of
the parties, underscores the importance of the text. 89 Article 33 of the
Vienna Convention, moreover, provides that when parties authenticate a
treaty in two or more languages, each text is equally authoritative unless
the treaty provides otherwise. 9 The majority of the Maori did not au-

184. Boast, supra note 78, at 7 n.24. This rule clarifies any possible uncertainty of
which text prevails, even as to tribes which signed both texts.
185. Id.
186. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899). Scholars and judicial authority alike find
United States cases persuasive because of the similarity of experiences with indigenous
peoples.
187. Id. at 5.
188. Williams, supra note 25, at 47.
189. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art . 31, 8 I.L.M. at 692-92. New Zealand
is a party to the Vienna Convention. Article 31(1) states the general rule of treaty interpretation to be that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose." Id. Article 31(3)(c) also gives effect to "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties." Id.
190. Id. art. 33, at 692-93.
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thenticate both texts of the Treaty. Great Britain signed both texts, but
only thirty Maori tribes signed both the English and Maori texts.191
Over 500 of the tribes signed only the Maori version of the Treaty of
Waitangi.' 92 Under article 33, the Maori text would prevail because that
was the only version of the text of the treaty which both parties
authenticated.

193

D.

Rights Under the Treaty

1. The Right of Sovereignty
The issue of sovereignty is the heart of the textual differences. Prior to
colonization New Zealand was populated by a distinct people with their
own institutions and government. The general rule concerning discovery
of new territories during the era of European colonization was that the
discovering government obtained title against all other European nations,
but discovery did not affect the rights of those already in possession of
the territory. 9 Contrary to this general rule, the English version of the
Treaty claims a cessation of all Maori sovereignty. The Maori text, in
contrast, uses the word rangatiratanga' 95 to identify the sovereignty remaining with the Maori.
2.

The Preemptive Right To Purchase Maori Land

Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi provides that the Maori yielded
to Great Britain the "exclusive right of preemption" to lands that the
Maori were willing to alienate.' 96 The general rule with respect to colonization was that the Crown would possess the exclusive right to
purchase those lands that the native peoples were willing to sell, and no

more. 197 This right of preemption was central to the 1847 case of The
Queen v. Symonds, 198 a decision New Zealand ignored for many years.

1'91. Boast, supra note 78, at 7.
192. Id.
193. There is no reason to believe that the 30 tribes that signed the English text
could bind the 500 who did not sign that version. Furthermore, the rule of contra profer-

entum suggests that the native language is controlling regardless of how many signed
both versions. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
194. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543-44.
195. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
196. Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 1.
197. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544-45.
198. 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387. This case was brought by two colonial government officials to settle the dispute among the settlers as to the validity of land titles that had not
been obtained from the Crown. It is important to note that the case involved two Europe-

706

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25:681

That decision has since emerged as the central authority for the determination of the rights under the Treaty of Waitangi.1 99 Symonds examined

whether a governor could waive Great Britain's right of preemption
under the Treaty of Waitangi.20 0 The purpose of the right to preemption
was to provide that all lands the Maori were willing to sell would become the absolute property of the Crown.2 °1 Individuals who purchased
land from the Maori lost title to Great Britain R. v. Symonds held that
"[p]urchases of land by subjects from Natives are good against the Native seller . .. , subject to legislative provisions-but not against the
Crown."2 °2 Most important about the Symonds decision is that the Maori title to land was never in question and that all parties explicitly recognized this fact.20 3 The only question remaining in Symonds was who
would benefit from the sale of land by the Maori.
The preemption right does not apply to lands that did not belong to
the Maori in 1840; those lands automatically became the property of
Great Britain.2 0 4 The critical question is what constitutes unappropriated, or surplus lands. The Maori claim that all of New Zealand was
Maori land: "The realities of Maori land ownership and land values are
thus: 'It may fairly be stated that, in pre-European days, there was no
area of land that was not claimed by some tribe.' "205 Great Britain used
the pre-emptive right, however, to dispossess the Maori of these claimed
land holdings. 20 ' This use violated Great Britain's good faith obligation
with respect to the right of pre-emption, as it classified all lands as surplus unless the Maori were using the land as a home, for crops, or for
herds. 207 As a result, Great Britain confiscated huge tracts of Maori land
during the nineteenth century by classifying them as unused. 20 ' The

tracts of land that the British unjustly took must be considered when
considering Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi.

ans, rather than a Maori asserting rights under the treaty. Williams, supra note 25, at
388-89.

199.
200.
201.
mission
202.
203.
204.
205.

Williams, supra note 25, at 385.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390-91 (citing a memorandum by the Chairman of the 1948 Royal Comon Surplus Lands, 1948 A.J.H.R).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Williams, supra note 25, at 394 (quoting PETER ADAMS, FATAL NECESSITY,
BRITISH INTERVENTION IN NEW ZEALAND 1830-1847, at 176-77 (1977)).
206. See id. at 395-96.
207. Id. at 396.
208. Id. at 396-97.
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3.

Rights and Privileges of British Citizenship

Article III grants the Maori the rights and privileges of British citizens. Great Britain commonly used this language in treaties with indigenous people to preclude competition from other European nations for the
newly discovered territory.2"' It was well known that the natives did not
fully comprehend, or even consider it material, that they were subjects of
Great Britain, so long as all parties understood that their independence
was undisturbed and that their right to self-government remained intact.210 Because there is no reason to believe that Great Britain conducted its relations any differently in its New Zealand colonization efforts than it had with the North American Indians, the article III rights
and privileges of British citizenship were probably intended to have limited apolization to the Maori.
V.

A.

SOLUTIONS

Domestic Solutions Employed by Other States

Indigenous peoples of various states have initiated substantial litigation to enforce their rights to land211 and to establish governmental recognition of their rights to self-government. The M~ori, in a position similar to that of indigenous peoples of other states, have a constitutional
relationship with the government of New Zealand"' and may find Ca-

nadian and United States resolutions of their problems with indigneous
peoples to be instructive. Some authorities, however, have suggested that
the Maori could never achieve to the type of relationship the American
Indians have with the United States government 1 ' because the inherent
characteristics of the New Zealand government make such a relationship
impossible. 1 4

209. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546-47.
210. Id. at 547. Justice Marshall stated that the Indians were:
[n]ot well acquainted with the exact meaning of words, nor supposing it to be
material whether they were called the subjects... so long as their actual independence was untouched, and their right to self-government acknowledged, they were
willing to profess dependence on the power which furnished supplies of which
they were in absolute need, and restrained dangerous intruders from entering their
country: and this was probably the sense in which the term was understood by
them.
Id. at 546-47.
211. See McHugh, Aboriginal Rights, supra note 117, at 58.
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., id. at 61-63.
214. See id. McHugh argues that the inherent distinction between political and legal
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The United States and Canada share similar histories, policies, and
legal treatment of the Native North Americans. 215 Both states have engaged in similar legal challenges to determine the rights of their indigenous peoples displaced from tribal lands. For example, litigation in the
United States in Worcester v. Georgia 16 addressed certain treaty obligations. In Canada, a- court recently considered the doctrine of aboriginal
title in the case Guerin v. The Queen.2 1" The future of Native American
rights in the United States may appear uncertain considering the Supreme Court's reluctance to review federal actions concerning tribes, but
Congress' apparent support of tribal rights may mitigate this reluctance.218 In contrast, the Canadian Parliament made progress when it
codified aboriginal rights in the 1982 Constitution Act. 21" Furthermore,
sovereignty makes the Crown's sovereignty exclusive and exhaustive, whereas in the
United States, those concepts are blended into one which makes a sharing of sovereignty
possible. Id.
According to the Vienna Convention, which is a codification of many of the rules of
customary international law, New Zealand is unable to claim its domestic law as a valid
reason for avoiding treaty obligations. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 46, 8
I.L.M. at 697. A state's claim at a later date that it is possible under their system of
government to allow to a .treaty does not justify' circumventing the rule of pacta sunta
servanda.Id. Article 61 of the Vienna Convention discusses impossibility as a reason for
avoidance but does not encompass the position that New Zealand argued for denying the
Maori their rights pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi. Id. art. 61, at 702. See id. art.
61(1), at 702. Article 61(1) provides:

A Party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for
terminality or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the
treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for
supending the operation of the treaty.
Id.
215. Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United
States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 643 (1991).
216. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Worcester was indicted for residing in the Cherokee nation without a license or permit. Id. at 515. Worcester was preaching the gospel
with the permission of the Cherokee. Id. He claimed that by virtue of treaties entered
into between the United States and the Cherokee, the Cherokee were an independent
nation and Georgia had no jurisdiction over their territory. Id. The Court agreed and
reversed the conviction. Id. at 562-63.
217. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (holding that aboriginal title was a preexisting legal right
that was not created by Great Britain).
218. Johnson, supra note 215, at 643. See generally Matthew D. Wells, Sparrow
and Lone Wolf: Honoring Tribal Rights in Canada and the United States, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 1119 (1991).

219. R.S.C. app. II, No. 44 (1985) (Can.); see also Errol P. Mendes, Interpreting
the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms: Applying Internationaland European
Jurisprudenceon the Law and Practiceof FundamentalRights, 20 ALBERTA L. REV.
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the Canadian Supreme Court has chosen to carefully scrutinize state actions that impact those rights.22 Because the United States and Canada
have already addressed many crucial aspects of treaty interpretation and
sovereignty, they should serve as models for a domestic resolution of the
Maori-New Zealand dispute.22
1. The Right to Self-Determination: The United States and Canadian
Models
Since 1970 every United States President and administration has embraced a policy of self-determination222 and allowed American Indians to
22 3
retain the right to govern member Indians on Indian owned lands.
Tribes posses all powers of self-government except those clearly altered
by Congress.224 Thus, the governmental powers retained by the tribes
are still quite substantial, as set forth in the case of Montana v. United
States:22 5
[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes
retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance
for members ....

• . . Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations ... [and]
...

may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activi-

ties of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members ....226

383 (1982).
220. Johnson, supra note 215, at 643.
221. One advocate, stressing the importance of Maori sovereignty stated: "For the
Maori, without sovereignty we are dead as a nation. It is not sovereignty or no sovereignty. It is sovereignty or nothing. We have no choice." DONNA AWATERE, MAORI
SOVEREIGNTY 32 (1984), quoted in Kelsey, supra note 3, at 102.
222. Johnson, supra note 215. at 663.
223. Id. at 666. See Duro v. Reina, 459 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribal courts
lack jurisdiction over non-member Indians). But see Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1991) (legislatively
reversing Duro for one year). See generally Peter Fabish, The Decline of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey From Dicta to Dogma in Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990),'66
WASH. L. REV. 567 (1991); Elizabeth A. Pearce, Self-Determinationfor Native Americans: Land Rights and the Utility of Domestic and International Law, 22 COLUM.
HUM. 'RTs. L. REV. 361 (1991).
224. Johnson, supra note 215, at 700.
225. 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981).
226. Id. at 564-65.
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Canadian relations with the North American Indians developed in a
different manner from those of the United States. Self-determination became an alternative only recently.2 2 Canadian politicians historically
have argued that Canada could not compromise territorial sovereignty in
any respect. 2 The Indian Act of Canada22 creates a band council system which results in minimal rights of self-governance among the Native
Indians. 3 1 More recent developments suggest that the government will
eventually adopt a system that recognizes the rights of Indian peoples to
self-government.23 1 Efforts at initiating more expansive authority have
not yet proved successful, and there Canada has yet to establish tribal
courts or to address environmental concerns, unlike the United States.2" 2
Some speculate, however, that Canada could recognize a form of native self-government on a basis other than that of traditional territorial
sovereignty. 233 Canada already employs nonterritorial sovereignty in the
areas of criminal law, income taxation on the basis of citizenship, diplomatic immunity, sovereign immunity, admiralty law, and military
law.2 34 What is critical is not Canada's present failure to establish a
more expansive right to self-government, but rather its trend toward recognizing self-determination.
2.

Prior Treaty Interpretation

The Canadian rules for interpretation of treaties with Indians are
similar to those developed in the United States. Generally, the plain

meaning should control, but, where the meaning is not plain, the terms
should be resolved in favor of the Indian." 5 This construction compels
Canadian courts to hold that Indian treaties do not expire for lack of
227.

Johnson, supra note 215, at 710-11. See generally Michael Hartney, Some

Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 293 (1991).
228. Geoff R. Hall, The Questfor Native Self-Government: The Challenge of Territorial Sovereignty, 50 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 39, 40 (1992).
229. Civilization of Indian Tribes Act of 1857, Ch.26, 1857 S.C. 84 (Can.); see also
Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 27 BUr. L. REv. 581 (1978).
230. See Johnson, supra note 215, at 709-10."
231. Id. at 710-11.
232. Id. at 712.
233. Hall, supra note 228, at 39.
234. Id. at 39, 41-60.
235. See Johnson, supra note 215, at 670-71; Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1
S.C.R. 29 (Can.); The Queen v. Simon, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 387 (Can.); Attorney General of
Quebec v. Regent Sioux, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (Can.). For a discussion of United States
treaty interpretation policies, see Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial

Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon
the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975).
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use,2 36 and in light of recent decisions, there is some doubt as to whether
treaty obligations can be modified or terminated."'
The United States resolved nearly all issues of aboriginal title through
the use of treaties and the 1946 Indian Claims Commission Act.2 38
United States courts also recognized the doctrine of aboriginal title in
cases such as Johnson v. M'Intosh.239 In Canada, however, many claims
based on aboriginal title still exist in Canada because Canada has not
established a body equivalent to the United States Indian Claims Commission. 240 Canadian courts have upheld aboriginal rights, however, at
least since the passage of the 1982 Constitution Act which recognizes
and affirms the rights of Indians.2 41
In Guerin v. The Queen,242 for example, the court found the doctrine
of aboriginal servitudes to be a pre-existing legal right which relied on
no affirmative action by the Crown. 24' The full effect of the plurality
decision in Guerin is uncertain,2 44 perhaps because Judge Dickson's concurring opinion attracts the most attention:
The Crown's fiduciary obligation to 'the Indians is therefore not a trust.

236. Attorney General of Quebec v. Regent Sioux, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (Can.).
237. Johnson, supra note 215, at 673. This position is in contrast to the United
States Supreme Court position that Congress has the plenary power to terminate Indian
treaties for any reason. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Canadian
approach may help the Maori in establishing the validity of their land claims.
238. Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049. The commission was terminated in 1978.
Johnson, supra note 215, at 680 n.194.
239. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.

Id.
240.
241.
242.

See Johnson, supra note 215, at 683.
Id. at 682-83.
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). The facts of Guerin involved the Musqueam In-

dian Band which had surrendered reserve land to be leased as a golf course. The land

was eventually leased on terms less favorable than those originally agreed to, without the
band's consent. Id.; see also Richard H. Bartlett, The Fiduciary Obligationof the Crown
to the Indians, 53 SASH. L. REv. 301 (1989); Darlene M. Johnston, A Theory of Crown
Trust Towards Aboriginal Peoples, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 307 (1986) [hereinafter Johnston, A Theory]; John Hurley, The Crown's FiduciaryDuty and Indian Title: Guerin
v. The Queen, 30 McGILL L. REV. 559 (1985).
243. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 336 (Can.).
244. See Johnston, A Theory, supra note 242, at 690.
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To say as much is not to deny that the obligation is trust-like in character.
... The... relationship ... bears a certain resemblance to agency, since
the obligation can be characterized as a duty to act on behalf of the Indian
Bands .... I iepeat, the fiduciary obligation which is owed to the Indians
by the Crown is sui generis. Given the unique character both of the Indians' interest in land and of their historical relationship with the Crown,
the fact that this is so should occasion no surprise.245
In the case affirming Indian rights, Regina v. Sparrow,246 the court
found that heavy governmental regulation in itself does not extinguish
fishing rights. a47 These two cases, combined with the 1982 Constitution,
represent major steps toward recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples
in North America.

Another major step is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 248 which recognizes and affirms aboriginal and treaty rights, and
actually serves as the model for New Zealand's draft bill of rights. Although the Charter is plagued with controversy, 249 Canadians appear to
be on the verge of including some form of self-government within the
meaning of aboriginal rights under section 35. 2 6 0 At the very least, there
are indications that aboriginal rights will be interpreted as including
some form of self-government-even if not as expansive as the system of
self-government which has evolved in the United States.25 '
Neither the United States nor Canada deserve praise for their historical dealings with North American Indians, but the regimes that have
evolved in these former British colonies should be of particular interest to
New Zealand-if New Zealand abandons its resistence to established
colonial policies toward native peoples. The concept of self-governance
inherent in the United States and the developing Canadian relations is of
particular import for the Maori.
B.
1.

New Zealand's Responsibility Under InternationalLaw

Incurring State Responsibility

If New Zealand fails to formulate adequate domestic remedies to the
treaty dispute the Maori may pursue relief uider international law.
'General principles of state. responsibility provide that when a state

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

[19841 2 S.C.R. at 387 (Dickson, J.,'concurring).
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1103-04 (Can.).
Id; see also Johnson, supra note 215, at 675.
McHugh, Aboriginal Rights, supra note 117, at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60-62.
Id.
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breaches its international obligations by its acts or omissions, it incurs
international responsibility to make reparations. 2 New Zealand has incurred liability for its nonadherence to its treaty obligations:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention
2
itself.

International responsibility arises regardless of the origin of the breach
254
of an international obligation.
Most states comply with the good faith requirement of the rule of
pacta sunt servanda, perhaps for no other reason than to avoid being
labeled a derelict within the international community.2 5 Thus, "[i]t is
probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
'
time."256
The Maori are party to a treaty that is outside this norm, and
enforcement seems illusive. Inasmuch as the rule of pacta sunt servanda
has not inspired adherence to the Treaty, and the decisions of the
Waitangi Tribunal are nonbinding on the government of New Zealand,
the Maori should pursue all other avenues of redress for violations of the
Treaty of Waitangi to afford its full enforcement.
2.

Reparations Available for Breach of State Responsibility

The Maori may pursue reparations for New Zealand's breach of its
international obligations. The Permanent Court of International Justice
found that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. 251 The
three forms of reparation available are restitution, indemnity, and satisfaction. 5 8 Restitution restores the circumstances which would have existed without the breach; it would require a return of property wrongsupra note 135, at 519.

252.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,

253.

Case Concerning the Factory at Ch6rzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)

No. 8, at 21 (July 27) (Jurisdiction) (emphasis added).
254. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 520.
255. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 97-98 (2d ed. 1979). See supra note

182-83 and accompanying text.
256. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 47.
257. Case Concerning the Factory at Ch6rzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) (Merits).
258. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 552.
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fully taken. 259 Indemnity, or the payment of money, is the most common
form of reparation for breach of an international obligation. The goal of
indemnity is to eradicate the consequences of the breach by paying the
injured party the value of lost profits and confiscated property.2 60 Profit
includes that which the party would have earned in the ordinary course
of events but for the breach, and excludes that which is speculative or
indeterminate. 2 1 The third type of reparation is that of satisfaction,
which provides reparation for nonmaterial damage or moral injury to the
state and is generally a presentation of the offending state's apology. 62
An arbitration agreement or compromise generally directs selection of
the most adequate form of reparation.'6 3 Tribunals facing the practical
difficulties of restitution often will select indemnity because of the administrative ease of that form of relief.2 64 Under international law, however, restitution in kind is the normal sanction for a breach of interna-

tional obligations.20 5 For the Maori, it seems that the most feasible
solution is partial restitution in kind for land and fishing rights, and
indemnity for any remaining uncompensated breaches. Some form of satisfaction is also appropriate as solace for the damage Great Britian and
New Zealand wreaked on the culture and social status of the Maori.
Although New Zealand must make reparations to the Maori for its
violations of international law, each method without the complementary
aid of the others would be ineffectual. New Zealand does not have expansive financial reserves to satisfy its obligations in this case, and much
of the land involved is now in private hands.2 6 The combination of restitution, indemnity and satisfaction presents an equitable solution for the
Maori, but, given New Zealand's resources, any reparation will either
fall short of what is due or cripple New Zealand's economy.

259. Id. at 553.
260, Id. Punitive damages are generally incompatible with the concept of reparation
because the goal is to restore the situation if the breach had not occurred, and not to
punish the wrongdoer. Id. at 553-54.
261. Id. at 553.
262. Id. at 554,
263. Id. at 553.
264. Id.
265.

See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M.

1,36 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1978). "[T]his Tribunal must hold that restitutio in integrum is,
both under principles of Libyan law and under the principles of international law, the
normal sanction ... and that it is inapplicable only to the extent that restoration of the
status quo ante is impossible." Id.
266. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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C. Peacejiul Dispute Settlement Measures Available Under
InternationalLaw
Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter directs states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. 26" Article 33 of the Charter further
directs states to pursue solutions through "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." 26
All of these procedures require the consent of both parties to resolve the
dispute.269 Generally, when a party withholds consent, disputes follow
one of three courses: they dissipate, fester and possibly escalate, or become the subject and justification for coercive measures against the withholding state.270 Considering the heightened racial tensions and the longstanding nature of the Maori struggle, there are indications that continuing strife would impact the international community and, therefore, New
Zealand is obligated under article 33 to take proactive measures to pursue peaceful solutions to the problem.
1. Negotiation
The first stage of settlement is usually negotiations between the affected parties. 271 Parties to a dispute employ diplomatic channels initially
in implementing reparation because they are less formal and more likely
to lead to a speedy solution to the conflict without embarrassment in the
international community. 2 Negotiations resolve most international dis-

267. The text of article 2(3) states: "All Members shall settle their international
disputes ... in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, re not
endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 3. New Zealand was an original signatory to the
Charter on June 26, 1945. Id.
268. Article 33 of the U.N. Charter states that parties must employ this means
whenever the dispute is likely to "endanger the international peace and security." Id. at
para. 1. This does not seem to be a direction that states should only employ these means
in those situations which would cause a general upheaval of the international community. The Maori situation would seem to qualify even under the plain language of article
33 because the characterization of New Zealand as a state which ignores its international
obligations could cause repercussions in its relations with other states.

269. See Robert E. Lutz II, Perspectives on the World Court, the United States, and
International Dispute Resolution in a Changing World, 25 INT'L LAW. 675, 676
(1991).
270. Id.

271.

Manfred Lachs, The Law and the Settlement of International Disputes, in

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONs,

ed., 1977).
272. Id.

287-89 (K. Venkata Raman
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putes. 273 The negotiation process has three steps: 1) diagnosis; 2) formulation of a principle to define the problem; and 3) applying the principle
to construct an agreement between the parties.2 4 The general requirement under international law concerning negotiation is that states are
under an obligation to "pursue them as far as possible with a view to
'27 5
concluding agreements.
Although the Maori have struggled for implementation of the Treaty
of Waitangi since its signing, they are now in a position to effectuate the
Treaty through negotiations. Many Maori leaders are active participants
in the Treaty dispute and are capable of engaging in serious negotiations
with the government of N~w Zealand to bring about a binding form of
settlement. The obligation under international law to negotiate disputes
is not, however, an obligation to actually settle, but merely to "try one's
best."' 27 6 A party who negotiates in good faith while the other party
utilizes delay tactics to increase tension 'between the parties probably has
fulfilled its obligation to engage in negotiations. 2 77 Therefore, the Maori
should attempt to meet New Zealand's efforts at resolving treaty differ-

ences by entering into good faith negotiations with the government.
If direct negotiations fail, the parties might undertake an alternative
dispute settlement procedure in the earlier stages of negotiation, which
would involve a commission composed of representatives of both parties
or of other states or individuals.27 Although convenient, the Waitangi
Tribunal could not assume this role because its decisions are non-binding and are subject to acceptance by the government of New Zealand.
Despite this weakness, the Tribunal's efforts play a key part in the exhaustion of local remedies, which may be a prerequisite to establishing
international obligations of reparation and persuading New Zealand to
2 79
agree to other solutions.

273. AKEHURST, supra note 174, at 201. Negotiation assumes a strong role in the
peaceful settlement of international disputes because it enables the states to exercise some
control over the outcome of a dispute settlement, whereas other means such as arbitration
and judicial proceedings allow less control. Lachs, supra note 271, at 287-89.
274. See William Zartman, Negotiation: Theory and Reality, in INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION 1, 2 (Diane B. Bendahmane & John W. McDonald, Jr. eds., 1984).
275. Lachs, supra note 271, at 287.
276. Id.
277. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 572.
278. Id. at 556.
279. Id. at 557-58. Generally, a state seeking remedies for injury to its nationals
must exhaust remedies in national courts and agencies. Id. The purpose of this is to

allow the state to settle claims within its own legal system. Id. It is uncertain whether
thqre are exceptions to this rule. Id.
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2.

Arbitration
If negotiation is either implausible or unfruitful, the parties may em-

ploy arbitration to reach a binding settlement of the claims. As with negotiation, arbitration requires the consent of both parties to the dispute. 2s° Unlike negotiation, arbitration leads to binding settlements
through application of the law. 2 1' An arbitral body is usually composed

of judges appointed by the parties but who are not subject to the parties'
direct influence or instructions. 2 2 Arbitration is both effective in the settlement of disputes and equitable to the parties involved.28 3 The flexibility of arbitration28 4 may be of particular help to a tribunal established to
resolve claims between New Zealand and the Maori.
To arbitrate the dispute, the parties would probably first execute an
independent agreement, or compromise.28 5 According to the International
Law Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 288 a compromise

should specify at least: the undertaking to arbitrate, the subject matter of
the dispute, and the composition of the tribunal.28 ' The agreement might
also include applicable rules of law, power to make recommendations,
power to make rules of procedure, applicable procedures, quorum for the
hearings, voting requirements, time limit for awards, rights to submit
individual or dissenting opinions, controlling languages, manner of ap-

280. Vratislav Pechota, Complementary Structures of Third-PartySettlement of International Disputes, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS,
supra note 271, at 149, 159-60.
281. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 587. For a
discussion of many of the issues, benefits, and drawbacks of arbitration, see Michael
Pryles, Legal Issues Concerning InternationalArbitrations, 64 AUSTL. L.J. 470 (Aug.

1990).
282. Id.; see also Jacques Werner, Interstate Political Arbitration: What Lies
Next?, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 69, 69 (1992). According to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, arbitration is a favored dispute settlement procedure be-

cause disputes are heard by judges of the parties' own choice, and on the basis of the law
involved. 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. 392 (1899) [hereinafter Pacific Settlement]; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 904 (1986); Pa-

cific Settlement, art. XV, 32 Stat. at 1788.

283.
284.

Pacific Settlement, supra note 282, art. XVI, 32 Stat. at 1788.
Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23

INT'L LAW. 187, 197 (1989). Generally, arbitral tribunals may resolve a sing!e claim,
may operate as a continuing body, or may handle certain categories of disputes. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 587. A specified category

in this case might be land or fishing claims under the Treaty of Waitangi.
285.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 589.

286.

Art. 2, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 83 (1958).
Id.

287.
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portioning costs and disbursements, and whether the International Court
of Justice may be allowed to provide services. 288 The tribunal would
settle any procedural points the compromise does not address.28 9 In most
instances the decisions of an arbitral tribunal are final, but the tribunal
may allow limited challenges.2 90 The formation of an arbitral body
would be an efficient and effective means of settling disputes between the
Maori and New Zealand because, unlike the Waitangi Tribunal whose
decisions are not binding on New Zealand, an arbitral body formed
under international law would issue binding decisions.2 91
The process of arbitration would require both the Maori and the government of New Zealand to agree to submit the dispute to an arbitral
tribunal. Both parties would participate equally in the selection of a tribunal's members, To expedite the process and increase the efficiency of
the tribunal, it could consolidate smaller claims. One obstacle the parties
must first overcome is the location of the tribunal, because locating a
tribunal in New Zealand might be prejudicial to the claims of the Maori
due to national public policies that have prevailed with respect to the
288. Id.
289. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 591.
290. An award may be challenged if a tribunal exceeded its authority, was corrupted, failed to state the reasons for the award, seriously departed from procedures, or if
there was never an undertaking to arbitrate. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, art. 35,
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 83, 86 (1958).
291. This arbitral body could be patterned, for example, after the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal. One model arbitral body is Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which was
formed pursuant to the Declaration of Algeria, 20 I.L.M. 223, 230 (1981). The tribunal
consists of nine members, three chosen by Iran, three by the United States, and the other
three appointed by the first six members. Id. at 231. Its decisions and awards are binding, and a fund was set up to compensate claimants. Id. at 232, 234. The tribunal is
required to respect the law and utilize those choice of law rules and principles of law
which are deemed to be applicable. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
supra note 135, at 599.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has been relatively successful, settling over
95% of claims submitted to it by the two governments. Charles N. Brower, Lessons to be
Drawn from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 51, 51 (1992). Many
small claims (less than $250,000) were resolved in a lump-sum settlement, whereas
others were considered individually. Id. at 52. Despite the continued political problems
between the two states, all awards adjudicated by the tribunal in favor of United States
claimants have been paid in full by Iran. Id. at 51. The success of the tribunal has been
attributed to several factors, including that only two nationalities were involved in the
arbitral process Id. at 52. One scholar has compared the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
with the United Nations Compensation Commission, involving over 28 nationalities,
which was set up to hear claims arising from the Gulf War. Id.
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Maori.2

3.

92

Redress from the International Court of Justice

Through issuance of an advisory opinion, the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) may assist the Maori in obtaining relief under either the
Treaty of Waitangi or under the doctrine of aboriginal title.293 Although
an advisory opinion would not grant direct redress to the Maori, it could

work to rebut arguments that the Maori had no capacity to enter into a
valid, legally binding treaty and that the Maori did not have possession
of the territory before the arrival of the European settlers. A favorable

opinion would also put more pressure on New Zealand to finally resolve
Maori claims.2" 4
In Western Sahara,a case concerning circumstances analogous to the
Maori's, the I.C.J. addressed whether the disputed territory, the Western Sahara, was terra nullius2 95 at the time of colonization by Spain.29 8
If the territory was terra nullius, a state could claim occupation.2"" If a
territory was not terra nullius, a state could acquire sovereignty only
through other means, such as agreements with local rulers. 298 The I.C.J.
held that although the Western Sahara was inhabited by nomadic tribes
lacking a European style of government, they exhibited a sufficient social
and political organization to preclude a finding of terra nullius. 2 9 The

292. See generally Nelson, supra note 284, at 195. Location was also a problem for
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Brower, supra note 291, at 53.
293. The court's advisory opinion in Western Sahara, addressed the status of disputed territory at the time of colonization. 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). The advisory opinion was requested by the General Assembly of the United Nations in response to competing claims for territorial sovereignty made by Morocco and Mauritania. Id.
294. Lutz, supra note 269, at 696. Although acivisory opinions are not binding, pres-

sure from the international community to respect advisory opinions may have the practical effect of making the decisions binding. Id.
295.

Territory belonging to no one 1975 I.C.J. at 37. "The expression 'terra nul-

lius' was a legal term of art employed in connection with 'occupation' as one of the
accepted legal methods of acquiring sovereignty over territory." Id. at 39.
296. Id.

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. The court observed:
[T]he State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by
tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as

terra nullius. It shows that in the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not generally considered as effected unilaterally through 'occupation' of
terra nullius ....

720

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[-Vol 25.681

I.C.J. also concluded that the tribes possessed legal rights relating to the
land through which they travelled.3 00
Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets
forth the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. 0 1 The Maori would be unable to
litigate the matter under the general jurisdiction of the court because
only states can be parties to cases before the I.C.J.30 2 The I.C.J. has
authority, however, to give advisory opinions on legal questions
presented by bodies authorized by, or in accordance with, the U.N.
Charter.3 03 The Maori may be able to persuade an authorized body of
the United Nations, as did the injured party in Western Sahara, to request an advisory opinion as to what method the British used to acquire
sovereignty over New Zealand."0 4
4.

Collective Measures Against New Zealand

If New Zealand persists in blocking full enforcement of the Treaty
provisions, the Maori have other avenues of redress. For example, the
Maori could seek the aid of the interntional community's collective sanctions. These measures fall within the discretionary authority of the
states.3 05 Even states not directly injured can employ collective countermeasures when a common concern of the international community is violated. 00 Potentially effective collective actions include severance of diplo307
matic relations, trade boycotts, or cessation of air or sea traffic.
The responsibility to" take collective action may arise from membership
in the United Nations. First, the acts of New Zealand toward the Maori
may constitute human rights violations.3 0 ' Second, the U.N. Security
300. Id. at 64-65. "[Tjhe nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti country should, in the
view of the Court, be considered as having in the relevant period possessed rights, including some rights relating to the lands through which they migrated." Id. at 64.
301. 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993. The I.C.J. has jurisdiction over cases referred by the
parties, or cases provided for in the Charter for the United Nations, treaties, or conventions in force. Id. art. 36(1), at 1060.
302, Id. art. 34, at 1059.
303. Id. art. 65, at 1063.
304. See generally Douglas C. Hodgson, Aboriginal Australians and the World

Court I-Sovereignty by Conquest, N.Z.L.J. Jan. 1985, 33, 35-36.
305. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 550.

306, Id.
307. Id. at 551.
308. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 provides:

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote: .. . c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
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Council has the authority to impose mandatory collective sanctions when
chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is implicated." 9 The situation in New
Zealand has already threatened widespread violence that could affect the
international community. In light of the reaction of the international
community to the apartheid regime in South Africa, there is some evidence of an international willingness to block efforts of states that disadvantage one class of people, particularly those native to the land. 1 The
international community may be willing to exert pressure on New Zealand to make peace with the Maori and grant concessions under the
Treaty, especially if the New Zealand government ignores the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The time for avoiding Treaty obligations and wrongfully subjecting
the indigenous peoples to a lower class status has long ended. The traditional perception among New Zealanders that the Treaty of Waitangi is
a nullity or incapable of implementation is simply incorrect. This Note
has shown that the Treaty is a valid legal document under international
law. The New Zealand government should assume its obligations pursuant to international law by implementing a more comprehensive domestic solution to the Treaty dispute. If New Zealand government does not
give the Waitangi Tribunal's decisions appropriate weight or if the Tribunal cannot fully and expediently fulfill its mission to settle claims with
the Maori, the government must implement a more effective domestic
regime.
Despite the many failures of other states in dealing with the rights of
indigenous peoples, these states should serve as models for New Zealand.
Particularly helpful may be those developments in addressing the concerns of the North American Indians. The United States settled most
property claims long ago with the establishment of the Indian Claims
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.

Id.
Article 56 provides for "joint and separate action in cooperation with the U.N. to
achieve this purpose. Id. art. 56. Although the actions of New Zealand may violate the
human rights of the Maori on other grounds as well, that is beyond the scope of this
Note.
309. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 135, at 551. These
measures are taken by the Security Council under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
including article 41. Collective measures were taken in 1968 against the minority regime
in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). S.C. Res. 253 (XXIII) (1968), 7 I.L.M. 897 (1968).
310. See S.C. Res. 253, supra note 309, at 897.
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Court. Canada is currently addressing many of the same property and
self-determination issues. This progress should serve as persuasive precedent to New Zealand in addressing local conflicts because the historical
beginnings are analogous in that Great Britain colonized the United
States, Canada, and New Zealand.
Both parties should also pursue remedies that are available under international law to resolve the dispute. The government of New Zealand
should participate in serious negotiations with the Maori leaders. Alternatively, the parties might establish an arbitral tribunal similar to the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to effectuate a final resolution of at
least the property rights the Treaty established. If New Zealand continues to diminish or avoid settlement of claims, the Maori should consider
strengthening their position by seeking an advisory opinion from the
I.C.J. They might also urge the international community to take up the
struggle of a people who have wrongfully had their land and fishing
rights appropriated and have been subjected to a lower class in society in
a struggle that has spanned over 150 years.
"It must be noted that laws cannot alter the habits of men, they cannot eliminate fears, prejudice, pride and irrationality." ' ' The prevailing
attitude in New Zealand toward the Maori as being less than equal is
fundamentally wrong, may constitute serious human rights violations,
and must end. The right to self-determination is one which is specifically
protected both in the Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi and under
the doctrine of aboriginal rights and, therefore, requires recognizing the
Maori right to self-government and instituting a system which will genuinely protect their culture. Claims under the Treaty of Waitangi must
find a resolution and New Zealand must establish a system that respects
Maori rights and self-determination.
Jennifer S. McGinty

311. John Tamihere, Te Take Maori: A Maori Perspective of Legislation and its
Interpretationwith an Emphasis on PlanningLaw, 5 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 137, 143
(1985).

